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 14.  Managing capital fl ows: the case of 
Singapore
Hwee Kwan Chow
14.1 INTRODUCTION
There has been much discussion on the state of the regional economies 
coinciding with the tenth anniversary of the Asian fi nancial crisis. As has 
been widely noted, the Asian economies recovered quickly from the crisis 
and are now amongst the fastest growing in the world. Since Asia has not 
experienced further crises in the past decade, can one infer that the region 
is now less vulnerable to the destabilizing eff ects of unfettered interna-
tional capital fl ows? After all, considerable eff orts have been undertaken 
to build buff ers and reduce vulnerabilities. Compared to the pre- crisis 
period, the Asian economies are now run more conservatively, have 
strengthened current accounts, and have signifi cant buildups in foreign 
reserves. Meanwhile, the fi nancial systems in the region have become more 
resilient, with the restructuring of balance sheets and the enhancement of 
surveillance.
However, there has been a resurgence of private capital fl ows into Asia 
since 2003. This resurgence has largely been attributed to the search for 
high- yielding investments arising from low interest rates in developed 
countries.1 In view of the pro- cyclicality of such capital fl ows (Kaminsky 
et al. 2004), some question whether the region’s exposure to a capital 
fl ow reversal will lead to yet another fi nancial crisis. It is clear that struc-
tural reforms and stronger economic fundamentals have increased Asia’s 
robustness towards such fi nancial shocks. In contrast to the 1997–98 
Asian crisis, the region has greater capacity to accommodate the capital 
outfl ows so that a liquidity crunch or balance of payments crisis is improb-
able. Nonetheless, should there be a sudden large- scale reversal of capital 
fl ows and undermining of investor confi dence, fi nancial market distress 
and other risk scenarios could ensue (Khor and Kit, 2007). In particular, 
the attendant sharp corrections in asset prices would have an adverse 
impact on the economy, especially through indirect channels.
The purpose of this chapter is to present Singapore’s experience in 
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managing the risks posed by capital fl ows as well as the retention of 
control over exchange rates and monetary conditions. At the outset, we 
note that Singapore has the support of strong economic fundamentals 
including persistent budget surpluses, huge foreign exchange reserves, 
substantial current account surpluses, high savings rates, low infl ation, 
robust institutions, a sound fi nancial system, and a stable currency. In this 
chapter, we address three key issues: Singapore’s exchange rate- centered 
monetary policy framework, monetary policy operations since the crisis, 
and the non- internationalization of the Singapore dollar. We consider 
how these three broad areas, along with a framework of consistent mac-
roeconomic and microeconomic policies, contribute towards defending 
Singapore against instability arising from free capital mobility.
14.2 TRENDS IN CAPITAL FLOWS2
A key feature of the Singapore economy is its extreme openness to trade 
and capital fl ows. The size of total imports and exports has been approxi-
mately three times that of GDP over the past three decades. In relation to 
capital fl ows, almost all forms of capital controls and foreign exchange 
restrictions have been dismantled since 1978. As a consequence of its small 
open nature, the Singapore economy has often been buff eted by shocks 
from the external environment such as the downturn in the global elec-
tronics industry in 1996–97, the Asian crisis in 1997–98, and the burst of 
the information technology bubble in 2001.
Notwithstanding the fl uidity of the economic environment and free 
capital mobility, Singapore has persistently recorded current account 
surpluses and exported capital abroad (Figure 14.1). With the lone excep-
tion of 2001, the overall balance of payments (BOP) has remained positive 
since 1990. In fact, the overall BOP surplus has been growing in recent 
years, refl ecting the expansion in the current account surplus over the 
same period. Concomitantly, the excess of national savings over invest-
ment has allowed Singapore residents to acquire foreign assets abroad. 
This includes the Singapore government investing public sector budget 
surpluses abroad.
To diff erentiate amongst the various types of capital fl ows, Figure 14.2 
provides a breakdown of the fi nancial account into foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI), portfolio investment, and other investment. From 1996 to 
2006 we observe a general pattern that net positive FDI is consistently 
off set by net outfl ows in portfolio and other investment accounts.
Direct investment infl ows have been on a general upward trend since the 
early 1990s. In comparison, with the exception of 2001, direct investment 
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Figure 14.1 Overall balance of payments (S$ billion)
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outfl ows have been hovering around S$10 billion.3 The strong infl ows of 
FDI refl ect Singapore’s commitment to attract multinational corporations 
to aid its economic growth. In terms of sectoral distribution, the fi nancial 
services, manufacturing, and commerce sectors are the major recipients 
of the FDI infl ows, accounting for 38 per cent, 33 per cent, and 16 per 
cent of the total FDI stock at end- 2005, respectively. As is well recog-
nized, such long- term infl ows are a relatively stable form of fi nance; they 
have undoubtedly been benefi cial for the development and growth of the 
Singapore economy.
In comparison, the portfolio investment account has consistently 
recorded net outfl ows. Portfolio infl ows have generally been on the rise 
in the post- crisis period, partly refl ecting a return of foreign investors to 
the local stock market since 2003. However, this is more than off set by 
the large portfolio outfl ows, which capture both government and private 
sector investment in foreign equity and debt markets. Portfolio fl ows tend 
to be volatile as investors have the fl exibility to shift from one fi nancial 
instrument into another as these instruments are traded. Indeed, portfolio 
investment has a tendency to accentuate crises (Dobson and Hufbauer, 
2001). In this regard, the low volume of portfolio infl ows (relative to FDI 
infl ows) helps to reduce Singapore’s vulnerability to capital fl ow reversal.
The main components of the other investment account include loans, 
and currency and deposits (C&D). The high volume of capital fl ows refl ects 
a lively interaction between domestic banks and foreign fi nancial institu-
tions (and other non- residents). As in the portfolio investment account, 
we observe an increase in both infl ows and outfl ows in the recent period, 
with the latter exceeding the former. Bank lending4 is, by conventional 
wisdom, considered to be more liable to reversal than all the other forms 
of capital fl ows including portfolio investment. In the case of portfolio 
fl ows, adjustments in the volume are mitigated by price adjustments of the 
relevant assets (Williamson, 2005). After the 1997 crisis, bank lending has 
been considerably reduced in net terms.
In total, gross capital infl ows have not only recovered after the crisis 
but have exceeded the pre- crisis peak level (Figure 14.3). The recent 
surge in capital infl ows poses several interesting questions. In par-
ticular, how do the various types of capital infl ows aff ect the domestic 
economy? What are the factors that serve to attract stable long- term 
capital fl ows while inhibiting volatile speculative infl ows? What poli-
cies and measures has the government adopted to meet with the chal-
lenges posed by volatile capital fl ows? These issues are examined in the 
 following sections.
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14.3  OVERVIEW OF MONETARY AND FINANCIAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
It has been observed that large capital infl ows often give rise to increases 
in money supply and domestic liquidity, appreciation of both nominal 
and real exchange rates, and acceleration in asset prices. Hence, a country 
experiencing excessive capital infl ows usually has to face the challenges 
of infl ationary pressures, loss of a competitive exchange rate (which 
could undermine the international competitiveness of its manufacturing 
sector) and misallocation of capital into unproductive projects. In what 
follows, we provide an overview of monetary and fi nancial developments 
in Singapore since 1990.
Domestic liquidity has been growing since the 1990s with the mon-
etary aggregates rising steadily until quarter one of 2006,5 after which 
they exhibited a sharp acceleration. Indeed, in 2006–07 the year- on- year 
(y- o- y) monetary growth rates (Figure 14.4) exceeded the y- o- y nominal 
GDP growth, which averaged 10 per cent only over the same period. The 
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Figure 14.3 Gross capital infl ows (S$ billion)
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various short- term interest rates – overnight, 1- month, and 3- month inter-
 bank rates – moved in tandem, staying below 4 per cent after the tempo-
rary spike to 6–7 per cent during the 1997 crisis.
Turning to exchange rates, we see from Figure 14.5 that the Singapore 
nominal and real eff ective exchange rates (NEER and REER, respec-
tively) exhibited an upward trend before the Asian crisis, refl ecting the 
Balassa–Samuelson eff ect. The NEER leveled off  after the weakening of 
the currency during the crisis. Nonetheless, an appreciation in the NEER 
is discernible in the most recent period, refl ecting a return of the Singapore 
dollar to an appreciation path against its major trading partners. By com-
parison, the REER continued its depreciation path for some time after the 
Asian crisis, refl ecting defl ationary trends in domestic wages until the most 
recent period. Correspondingly, while the consumer price infl ation stayed 
low, growth rates of unit labor cost have frequently been negative in the 
post- crisis.
By contrast, stock prices have risen rapidly since 2003 (Figure 14.6) in 
tandem with the increase in portfolio infl ows to the local stock market. 
A similar surge in property prices started only in the later period, with 
rising foreign investor interest in the high- end residential segment of the 
property market.
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Concomitantly, we observe a pickup in the trend for loans to the con-
struction sector in the recent period. Meanwhile, loans to the commerce 
and fi nancial sectors also registered a rise in the corresponding period. 
However, loans to the manufacturing sector mostly remained steady 
(Figure 14.7).
As for the real economy, the FDI infl ows into the various sectors of 
the economy have boosted the growth of these sectors. Manufacturing, 
fi nancial and commerce sectors all exhibited relatively faster growth rates 
since 2004, no doubt benefi ting from direct investment fl ows into their 
industries.
14.4  EXCHANGE RATE- CENTERED MONETARY 
POLICY FRAMEWORK
14.4.1 Exchange Rate as Key Monetary Policy Instrument
Despite the increase in capital fl ows since 2004, Singapore’s NEER has 
been relatively stable. To advance our understanding of how the central 
bank retains control over the exchange rate, we consider the monetary 
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policy framework. A unique feature of Singapore’s monetary policy 
framework is the use of the exchange rate instead of the more conventional 
benchmark policy interest rate as the key policy operating tool. Singapore, 
as an international fi nancial center, has opted for free capital mobility. 
With reference to the open- economy trilemma,6 it follows that the central 
bank can choose to use as its key policy instrument only one nominal vari-
able of the three: the exchange rate, the interest rate, or a monetary aggre-
gate. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has chosen to use the 
exchange rate as an intermediate target since the early 1980s.
The rationale of this decision is clear. A high- import content of about 
60 per cent in domestic consumption, as well as being a price taker in 
the international markets, implies that Singapore is highly susceptible 
to imported infl ation. It is thus unsurprising that the exchange rate is 
considered to be a more eff ective tool than the interest rate for stabilizing 
infl ation. The other main infl uence on domestic cost pressures has been 
labor supply. While the tightness of the labor market has been somewhat 
eased by immigration policies, the exchange rate policy has helped to 
dampen aggregate demand, thereby reining in wage infl ation. In a study 
on Singapore’s monetary transmission mechanism, Chow (2005) found 
that the exchange rate has a highly signifi cant impact on the level of eco-
nomic activity. Such a result is not in the least unexpected in view of the 
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substantial contribution of external demand to growth – exports account 
for around two- thirds of total demand.
By contrast, the Singapore economy is less sensitive to interest rates. 
Firstly, domestic investment is not very sensitive to the interest rate 
because Singapore’s heavy reliance on FDI limits the impact of the cost 
of domestic borrowing. Secondly, a decline in housing wealth, plausibly 
caused by a rise in mortgage rates, does not seem to have signifi cant damp-
ening eff ects on aggregate consumption, even though houses are a major 
component of personal wealth in Singapore (Abeysinghe and Choy, 2004). 
This rather unusual fi nding has been attributed to the illiquid nature 
of Singapore’s housing assets, as well as the strong bequest motives of 
Singaporean households (Phang, 2004). It is thus unsurprising that inter-
est rates are deemed to have a relatively weaker eff ect than exchange rates 
on price stability, which is the fi nal policy target.
Given the economy’s vulnerability to external shocks, it is pertinent for 
Singapore’s monetary policy to play a counter- cyclical role in minimizing 
the impact of these and other shocks on the domestic economy. Parrado 
(2004) investigated the counter- cyclical nature of Singapore’s monetary 
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policy through the use of a monetary reaction function. A variant of the 
Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) was estimated, using changes in the exchange 
rate instead of the interest rate as the policy variable to refl ect the use of 
the exchange rate as the key monetary policy instrument. The two target 
variables were infl ation and output gap measures. The results suggest that 
monetary policy in Singapore does have a forward- looking orientation 
aimed at dampening infl ation and output volatility. This fi nding concurs 
with the stated objective of the monetary policy of the MAS, which is ‘to 
ensure low infl ation as a sound basis for sustained economic growth.’
In a related study by McCallum (2007), a similar Taylor type policy rule 
was estimated. In that study, deviations of the real exchange rate from 
its equilibrium were included as an additional target variable. While the 
real exchange rate deviation variable turned out to have no explanatory 
power, the infl ation variable remained highly important and the output 
gap variable was signifi cant. The empirical evidence suggests that the real 
exchange rate does not play a role as an independent macroeconomic 
objective, but that adjustments in the policy variable are consistent with 
a policy designed to stabilize infl ation and output around their desired 
target levels. In other words, Singapore’s monetary policy framework is 
like a variant of infl ation targeting.
The past track record of low infl ation and prolonged economic growth 
attests to the eff ectiveness of using the exchange rate as a key policy instru-
ment for an ultra- open economy like Singapore, albeit with the support of 
fl exible factor markets and strong institutions.
14.4.2 Basket- Band- Crawl Exchange Rate Regime
In implementing the exchange rate- centered monetary policy, the MAS 
manages the Singapore dollar under a basket- band- crawl (BBC) system 
(Khor et al., 2004; Williamson, 1999). Under this intermediate exchange 
rate regime, the MAS monitors the value of the Singapore dollar in terms 
of a basket of currencies. Given Singapore’s diversifi ed trade pattern, tar-
geting a currency basket instead of a single foreign currency will result in a 
more stable eff ective exchange rate. The currency basket, termed the trade-
 weighted index (TWI), is a trade- weighted average of the currencies of 
Singapore’s major trading partners and competitors. These represent the 
various sources of imported infl ation as well as competition in the export 
markets, with the basket weights refl ecting their degree of importance. 
Neither the constituent currencies nor their assigned weights in the basket 
are made public by the MAS.
The MAS uses a prescribed policy band centered at a parity, which is 
the target exchange rate for the TWI. The target rate refl ects the long- run 
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equilibrium exchange rate and is allowed to adjust gradually over time, 
keeping the policy band in tandem with Singapore’s slowly changing long-
 term economic fundamentals. It is critical not to make parity changes in 
occasional large steps, as in an adjustable peg exchange rate regime, as this 
attracts large capital fl ows speculating on an impending change. The crawl 
circumvents the emergence of a situation where the currency becomes 
signifi cantly misaligned. It thereby reduces the incentive for speculative 
attacks against the currency. Notably, MacDonald (2004) and Lee (1999) 
amongst others have found no sustained deviation of Singapore’s real 
exchange rate from its equilibrium level even when the equilibrium value 
of the currency is measured using diff erent approaches.
The TWI is allowed to fl oat within the prescribed policy band to allow 
for short- term fl uctuations in the foreign exchange markets. Like the 
central rates, the band limits are undisclosed. The MAS can directly 
infl uence the value of the currency and defend the band by carrying out 
intervention operations in the foreign exchange markets. When the TWI 
approaches or exceeds the boundaries of the policy band, the MAS may 
carry out intervention to ‘lean against the wind’, which means resisting 
the recent trend of the exchange rate, thereby preventing the bounds from 
being breached. Such intervention operations always resist misalignments 
and push the TWI towards its estimated equilibrium value, as in the refer-
ence rate proposal (Williamson, 2007). Additionally, the MAS can also 
intervene within the band to smooth out short- term exchange rate volatil-
ity as the latter could impair confi dence in the currency.
We highlight two key features regarding the policy band that help to 
discourage one- sided bets and speculative attacks. First, the band is suf-
fi ciently wide so that market participants cannot be sure of making a profi t 
even when they correctly speculate on an impending change. Second, a 
BBC with hard bands, whereby the central bank is obliged to carry out 
intervention whenever the limits are reached, is avoided. This type of 
exchange rate regime is akin to a crawling band and, based on empirical 
evidence, could provoke a crisis. Hence, the authorities can either blur the 
edges of the bands or not disclose them at all.
Under the managed fl oat system, it is pertinent to have large foreign 
reserves ready for use to defend the currency. The Singapore dollar is more 
than fully backed by foreign reserves. In any case, the central bank enjoys 
high credibility earned from its track record in maintaining low infl ation 
and a strong domestic currency. Consequently, most market participants 
are convinced that the MAS is committed to enforcing the policy band 
and they thus tend to keep within the bounds. Such market discipline in 
turn reduces the need for frequent central bank intervention operations 
(Krugman, 1991). Contrary to the conventional wisdom at the time of the 
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Asian crisis that intermediate exchange rate regimes are not viable, the 
MAS has deterred speculators from attacking the domestic currency and 
has successfully maintained a managed fl oat since the 1980s.
14.5  MONETARY POLICY OPERATIONS SINCE THE 
ASIAN CRISIS
14.5.1 Policy Reactions during the Asian Crisis
Notwithstanding a generally sound domestic environment, contagion 
from neighboring crisis- hit countries could mean that the fallout from 
volatile capital fl ows is unavoidable. A case in point is the Asian crisis, 
when Singapore’s GDP dropped by 0.9 per cent while both the equity and 
property markets plunged. The Straits Times Index of stock prices fell by 
60 per cent from a high of 2055.44 in January 1997 to 856.43 in September 
1998. Meanwhile, the private property price index suff ered a drop of 40 
per cent from 270 in quarter one of 1997 to 163.7 in quarter four of 1998 
(Chan and Ngiam, 1998). Aware that the rigidity of the exchange rate was 
a channel of vulnerability, Singapore accepted market- driven deprecia-
tions in the wake of, and amid the deepening of, the crisis in tandem with 
deteriorating fundamentals. The Singapore dollar fell by 18.3 per cent 
against the US dollar (USD) from S$1.43 per USD the day before the fl oat 
of the baht, to S$1.75 per USD on 7 January 1998 (Kapur, 2005).7
The immediate market- driven depreciations brought about a suffi  ciently 
depreciated Singapore dollar that reduced the gains from further specula-
tion. This lowered the incentive for currency speculators to engineer an 
over- depreciation in the domestic currency (Yip, 2005). Had Singapore 
adhered to a fi xed currency peg and defended the currency from the begin-
ning, greater adjustments – and thus, higher volatility in the real economy 
– would have been necessary. Instead, the MAS widened the boundaries 
of the policy band as it met with increased uncertainty during the crisis to 
allow for greater fl exibility in managing the exchange rate. Subsequently, 
when the volatility in the regional markets subsided, the width of the band 
was narrowed. The quick reaction of the authorities as well as the fl ex-
ibility in the exchange rate system have been advantageous in aligning the 
domestic currency with changing economic fundamentals and allowing 
the new equilibrium to emerge rapidly. No doubt, this contributes to the 
credibility of Singapore’s exchange rate system and is one of the factors 
that helped to lessen the severity of the crisis.
The depreciation of the Singapore dollar during the 1997 Asian crisis 
(as well as during other major economic downturns) was accompanied by 
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wage cuts in the form of downward adjustments in the contribution rates 
to the Central Provident Fund (CPF), which is a government- administered 
compulsory saving scheme. Prior to the crisis, employees and employers 
were each required to contribute 20 per cent of the employees’ income to 
the CPF. With the outbreak of the crisis, the employer’s CPF contribution 
rate was reduced to 10 per cent coupled with a two- year wage restraint to 
bring down labor costs. In addition, other administrative policy measures 
such as cost- cutting and budgetary measures were employed.
Such coordination of wage adjustments and cost- cutting measures with 
the concurrent depreciation of the domestic currency alleviates the need 
for a bigger NEER depreciation targeted at preserving Singapore’s inter-
national competitiveness edge. In this way, monetary policy in Singapore 
is complemented by a proactive and fl exible wage policy, whereby real 
depreciations in the Singapore dollar are partly eff ected through defl ation-
ary wage and price adjustments when the economy is hit by severe negative 
shocks.
14.5.2 Monetary Policy during the Post- Asian Crisis Period
We next examine the conduct of monetary policy during the post- crisis 
period. Prior to 2001, the MAS would disclose the general thrust of its 
exchange rate policy stance via occasional policy announcements made 
by senior central bank offi  cials. In early 2001, the MAS formalized the 
announcement of the exchange rate policy stance through a Monetary 
Policy Statement in conjunction with its semi- annual exchange rate policy 
cycle. Box 14.1 traces Singapore’s exchange rate policy stance since the 
Asian crisis.
We observe from the table the various forms of adjustments to the TWI 
allowed by the BBC exchange rate regime. First, changes to width of the 
band can be carried out (as announced in the 11 September 2001 state-
ment) in response to periods of heightened volatility. Second, there can be 
a re- centering of the policy band (as announced in the July 2003 statement) 
and third, a change to the slope of the crawl in the central parity can be 
eff ected (as announced in the October 2007 statement). These diff erent 
ways of adjustments demonstrate the fl exibility accorded by the exchange 
rate system, which allows the MAS to use the exchange rate to accom-
modate shocks to as well as structural changes in the economy (Khor et 
al., 2007).
Since the BBC exchange rate system has functioned well for Singapore, 
a natural question arises as to whether it should be recommended for 
the other regional economies. To adopt this exchange rate arrangement, 
credible political commitment from the authorities is necessary. Countries 
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BOX 14.1  TRACING SINGAPORE’S EXCHANGE 
RATE POLICY STANCE
Late 1990s  Against the backdrop of subsiding inﬂ ation 
and stalling economic growth, MAS ended 
the decade- long trend of appreciation of 
the TWI and eased policy to a neutral 
setting with the policy band centered on a 
zero appreciation path.
Early 2000  Against a backdrop of a favorable external 
environment and a strong rebound in the 
domestic economy, MAS tightened policy 
by inducing a gradual appreciation of the 
TWI.
January 2001  MAS maintained a gradual appreciation of 
the TWI to keep inﬂ ationary pressures in 
check.
July 2001  Against a backdrop of a weak external 
environment, global electronics downturn, 
and subsiding inﬂ ationary pressures, MAS 
eased policy to a neutral setting with the 
policy band centered on a zero apprecia-
tion path.
11 September 2001  Against a backdrop of an uncertain exter-
nal environment and downside risks to 
the domestic outlook, policy bands were 
widened. When a degree of calm returned 
to the foreign exchange market, the nar-
rower bands were restored but the neutral 
stance was maintained.
July 2003  In view of the downside risk in the external 
environment, MAS lowered the policy band 
by re- centering it at the then current level 
of TWI, while maintaining a zero apprecia-
tion path.
April 2004  Against a more favorable growth outlook 
for the domestic economy, and the risk
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should also have the capacity required to operate the system. This involves 
a good sense of what the equilibrium exchange rate level is and how it is 
evolving; the ability to resist intervention within a suffi  ciently wide policy 
band; having the latitude to carry out prompt large- scale intervention 
operations to defend the band; and possessing good judgment of what 
market conditions require policy band widening. Nevertheless, it is still 
possible that the fl exibility accorded by the BBC regime may not be suf-
fi cient to deal with extremely severe external shocks. A case in point is 
Indonesia, which had to abandon its BBC regime when hit by contagion 
from Thailand during the Asian crisis (Williamson, 2007).
14.5.3 Management of Domestic Liquidity
What impact do foreign exchange interventions – carried out mostly to 
moderate the appreciation of the Singapore dollar – have on domestic 
liquidity? Defending appreciations usually leads to an increase in foreign 
reserves and a rise in the monetary base, thereby raising infl ationary pres-
sures in the domestic economy unless the central bank carries out steri-
lization. Indeed, excessive credit growth and the high costs of sterilized 
foreign exchange interventions are well- recognized challenges posed by 
large capital infl ows.
However, instead of having to manage excess domestic liquidity and 
withdraw funds, the MAS is generally in the position to supply funds to 
the domestic banking system. The fi rst reason for this is prudent fi scal 
management – the Singapore government has continued to run budget 
surpluses averaging around 5 per cent of GDP since the crisis. As the gov-
ernment’s fi nancial agent, the MAS is in receipt of public sector surpluses 
from the government, which in eff ect removes liquidity from the domestic 
economy. The second reason is that the contributions to the CPF tend to 
  of rising inﬂ ationary pressures, MAS 
announced a shift towards a gradual and 
modest appreciation of the TWI.
October 2007  Against a backdrop of rapid expansion of 
the domestic economy and rising inﬂ ation-
ary pressures, MAS increased slightly the 
slope of the TWI policy band while main-
taining a modest and gradual appreciation 
of the TWI policy band.
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be in excess of withdrawals, and these positive net contributions to the 
CPF also eff ectively represent a withdrawal of funds from the domestic 
fi nancial system. In fact, both the public funds transfers and the CPF net 
contributions channel substantial liquidity out of the economy, causing 
the money supply to shrink and putting pressure on the Singapore dollar 
to appreciate.
The MAS can actively off set this liquidity drain through foreign 
exchange operations that use the Singapore dollar to purchase the US 
dollar. In this way, funds are channeled back to ensure an appropriate 
level of liquidity in the domestic banking system, thereby off setting the 
eff ect on the exchange rate. In fact, the MAS can achieve a wide range 
of exchange rate appreciation or depreciation by controlling the amount 
of liquidity re- injection. By the same token, the MAS can exert a limited 
degree of control over domestic interest rates by varying the amount of 
liquidity re- injections, particularly when the TWI is ‘fl oating’ within the 
prescribed policy band. For instance, if the economy is deemed to be over-
heating, less liquidity could be re- injected into the market. The relative 
reduction in the money supply would raise domestic interest rates, which 
would in turn help to cool the economy. Conversely, if the economy is 
slowing down, the MAS could re- inject more liquidity into the economy 
with an attendant reduction in the domestic interest rates, which would 
help to stimulate the economy.
Domestic interest rates in Singapore are generally lower than US inter-
est rates, refl ecting investor expectations of an appreciation of the domes-
tic currency. However, Figure 14.8, which depicts the ex-post three- month 
uncovered interest diff erential, reveals that the diff erentials are quite dif-
ferent from zero, and, as pointed out by Yip (2003), they are substantially 
larger in magnitude compared with corresponding fi gures from Hong 
Kong, China. Hence, the fl uctuations in the diff erentials are indicative of 
some autonomy in the interest rate policy, albeit to a rather limited extent. 
This is because Singapore’s extensive network of international fi nan-
cial and trade linkages results in such huge and rapid capital fl ows that 
domestic interest rates are largely determined by foreign interest rates and 
market expectations of the future value of the Singapore dollar.8
To complement its exchange rate policy, the MAS conducts money 
market operations in order to foster orderly money market conditions. 
The MAS adds or withdraws funds from the market using instruments 
such as foreign exchange (reverse) swaps, direct lending to or borrowing 
from banks, direct purchase or sales of Singapore Government Securities 
(SGS), and repurchase agreements on SGS (MAS, 2003). With the use of 
such money market operations, the MAS is able to pump in or mop up 
liquidity from the domestic banking system on a massive scale in response 
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to economic and fi nancial developments. For instance, the MAS injected 
S$2.5 billion into the domestic banking system in the immediate aftermath 
of the September 11 terrorist attacks to forestall turmoil in the local fi nan-
cial markets.
14.6  NON- INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE 
SINGAPORE DOLLAR
Arising from the use of the exchange rate as a benchmark policy instru-
ment, the policy of non- internationalization of the Singapore dollar was 
adopted in the early 1980s as a rather limited form of capital control. 
Singapore has eradicated all exchange controls since 1978 in order to 
promote the development of its off shore fi nancial markets. Hence, resi-
dents and non- residents are free to remit Singapore dollar funds in and 
out of Singapore and are also free to purchase or sell Singapore dollars in 
the foreign exchange market. Singapore’s role as an international fi nancial 
center has also led to the development of a large off shore banking sector, 
the Asian Dollar Market (ADM), whose assets are denominated in foreign 
currencies. There are no controls on capital fl ows between the ADM and 
the domestic banking system, so holders of Singapore dollars can easily 
convert their funds into foreign currency deposits and vice versa.
However, the absence of capital restrictions means that speculative 
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Figure 14.8  Ex- post three- month uncovered interest diff erential, 1990: 
M01–2007: M12 (per cent)
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attacks on the Singapore dollar could compromise the conduct of the 
exchange rate- centered monetary policy. The non- internationalization 
policy, which restricted the international use of the domestic currency, 
essentially protected the Singapore dollar from speculative attacks to 
facilitate the eff ective conduct of monetary policy. At the same time, the 
policy ensured that the growth of the Singapore dollar market was in line 
with the development of the economy. Under the non- internationalization 
policy, safeguards were put in place to prevent a buildup of off shore 
deposits of the currency that could be used by speculators to short the 
Singapore dollar. These included allowing bank credit in the Singapore 
dollar to be extended to non- residents only in cases where borrowing 
was meant for funding real economic activities. Additionally, restrictions 
were imposed on inter- bank Singapore dollar derivatives to limit access 
to liquidity in the onshore foreign exchange, currency, and interest rate 
swaps and options markets in order to hinder leveraging or hedging of 
Singapore dollar positions. These restrictions mainly took the form of 
consultative requirements to limit speculative activities in Singapore’s 
fi nancial markets, and did not seem to have impeded trade and capital 
mobility (Lee, 2001).9
Nevertheless, the restrictions became overly binding as the Singapore 
economy became more globalized and its fi nancial industry matured. 
In the fi rst place, increased demand by corporate players and fi nancial 
institutions for the Singapore dollar and its derivatives for commercial 
transactions called for the liberalization of the policy. Secondly, the non-
 internationalization policy hampered the development of Singapore’s 
capital markets, particularly the bond market. For instance, short- sales 
of securities and access to domestic currency credit lines are essential to 
deepen market liquidity (see Gobat, 2000). Hence, under the imperative 
to foster greater fi nancial sector diversifi cation the restrictions on the non-
 internationalization of the Singapore dollar were progressively relaxed. 
Four major reviews were undertaken after the Asian crisis, resulting in the 
lifting of restrictions to avert obstruction of market activities. Box 14.2 
traces the evolution of the non- internationalization policy.
The current policy has only two core requirements, as stated in the 
revised MAS Notice 757 of 28 May 2004. First, fi nancial institutions may 
not extend Singapore dollar credit facilities exceeding S$5 million to non-
 resident fi nancial entities where they have reason to believe that the pro-
ceeds may be used for speculation against the Singapore dollar. Second, 
for a Singapore dollar loan exceeding S$5 million to a non- resident 
fi nancial entity or for a Singapore dollar equity or bond issue by a non-
 resident entity that is used to fund overseas activity, the Singapore dollar 
proceeds must be swapped or converted into foreign currency before use 
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BOX 14.2  EVOLUTION OF THE 
NON- INTERNATIONALIZATION POLICY
1983  The policy codiﬁ ed into MAS Notice 621, whereby access 
to the Singapore dollar is restricted for both residents and 
non- residents.
1992  Amendment is made to MAS Notice 621 to lift the consul-
tation requirement for extension of Singapore dollar credit 
facilities of any amount where the funds are to be used to 
support economic activities in Singapore.
1998  In conjunction with an extensive ﬁ nancial sector liberali-
zation program, the new MAS Notice 757 replaces MAS 
Notice 621, whereby all restrictions on residents are lifted; 
some restrictions on non- residents in relation to arranging 
Singapore dollar equity listings and bond issues of foreign 
companies are relaxed.
1999  To foster the development of Singapore capital markets, 
banks are allowed to engage in a wider range of activi-
ties – namely, to transact all Singapore dollar interest 
rate derivatives with non- residents freely and arrange 
Singapore dollar equity listing for foreign companies.
2000  Only measures to limit access to the Singapore dollar for 
speculative activity remain. Banks are allowed to freely 
extend Singapore dollar credit facilities to non- residents 
for investment purposes in Singapore and to fund offshore 
facilities provided the proceeds are ﬁ rst swapped into 
foreign currency before remitting abroad.
2002  All individuals and non- ﬁ nancial institutions are exempted 
from the Singapore dollar lending restrictions. Non- resident 
ﬁ nancial entities are permitted to engage in a wide range 
of derivative transactions.
2004  Non- resident non- ﬁ nancial issuers of Singapore dollar 
bonds and equities are no longer required to swap their 
Singapore dollar proceeds into foreign currencies before 
remitting them abroad.
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outside Singapore. These restrictions do not apply to non- resident fi nan-
cial institutions and there is currently a large off shore market in Singapore 
dollars abroad. Nevertheless, the MAS deems the current policy useful to 
deter off shore speculators from accessing liquidity in Singapore’s onshore 
foreign exchange swaps and money markets (MAS, 2002).
On the fi rst restriction, there is clearly an element of judgment involved 
in determining whether a client intends to engage in speculative activities. 
In the words of the MAS, 
Financial institutions are expected to institute appropriate internal controls and 
processes to comply with this restriction . . . [these] include [obtaining] written 
confi rmation from the non- resident fi nancial institution specifying the purpose 
of funding . . . and [executing a] formal evaluation process of the client profi le, 
which provides a clear basis for assessing that the client is unlikely to use the 
Singapore dollar proceeds for currency speculation. (MAS, 2006, p. 3)
In view of MAS’s tough reputation, fi nancial institutions are expected to 
err on the side of caution when implementing this policy. As for the second 
restriction, which has been in eff ect since 28 May 2004, non- resident non-
 fi nancial issuers of Singapore dollar bonds and equities are no longer 
required to swap their Singapore dollar proceeds into foreign currencies 
before remitting them abroad. The amendment to the policy relieves 
foreign issuers from incurring the additional cost of swapping, thereby 
removing an advantage in directly issuing foreign currency bonds. For 
non- resident fi nancial institutions, however, the requirement is retained.
With the lifting of the various restrictions, there is no longer a non-
 internationalization policy per se. Rather, the policy has been reduced to a 
lending restriction and is now known as MAS policy on lending Singapore 
dollars to non- resident fi nancial institutions. Has the liberalization of the 
non- internationalization policy resulted in the Singapore dollar being at 
risk of speculative attacks, or has the policy outlived its purpose? The past 
restrictions by themselves are unlikely to have been the single most impor-
tant factor in protecting the Singapore dollar against speculative attacks. 
Rather, it is the maintenance of both internal and external macroeconomic 
balance as well as the absence of balance sheet vulnerabilities that off ers 
little incentive for speculators to wage attacks against the currency or to 
circumvent the restrictions for speculative purposes. Furthermore, the 
MAS places great emphasis on the prudential supervision of fi nancial 
institutions, ensuring sound credit practices and a strong capital posi-
tion.10 In addition to its strong banking system, Singapore continues to 
develop deep and liquid capital markets for the effi  cient intermediation of 
fi nancial fl ows, thereby enhancing the resilience of its fi nancial system to 
shocks.
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14.7 CONCLUSION
In summary, Singapore’s experience with capital fl ows after the Asian 
crisis appears to have been somewhat benign. Clearly, it is the overall 
package of policies – including strong economic fundamentals and a 
robust fi nancial system, prudent policy management on both the fi scal and 
monetary side, and credible exchange rate policy aligned with underly-
ing fundamentals – that serves to increase Singapore’s resilience towards 
disruptive swings in capital fl ows. In addition, the government also relies 
on direct credit controls when appropriate, such as in curbing surging 
residential property prices due to availability of easy credit. In view of the 
destabilizing eff ects of sudden shifts in capital fl ows, particular emphasis 
has been placed on having the latitude to react promptly and on a suffi  -
ciently large scale to economic and fi nancial developments.
Pronounced shifts in capital fl ows, regardless of whether they are 
triggered by misguided policies or contagion, are often associated with 
the loss of foreign investor confi dence in the prospects for the domestic 
economy. Ocampo (2003) found that the variations in capital fl ows can be 
attributed primarily to shifts in risk evaluation. We have highlighted the 
need for disciplined macroeconomic and fi nancial policies as well as the 
crucial role of strong mature institutions, strong human resource capacity, 
and strong governance in order to bolster the confi dence of investors and 
other market participants. In this regard, it is important for the regional 
economies to continue the process of building a sound and effi  cient 
domestic fi nancial system, and installing an eff ective system of prudential 
supervision.
Domestic fi nancial development is often achieved through prudent 
external fi nancial liberalization, which tends to catalyze both fi nancial 
deepening and broadening. Chow and Kriz (2007) pointed out that the 
extent of domestic fi nancial development and the scope of capital account 
liberalization need to be managed holistically, as interactions between 
them present both opportunities for growth and potential risks.11 On the 
one hand, suffi  ciently developed domestic fi nancial sectors are necessary 
to absorb and allocate capital infl ows to their most effi  cient uses. On 
the other, domestic fi nancial markets cannot fully realize their potential 
without exposure to international capital markets. For instance, partial 
international liberalization exerts pressure to overcome entrenched inter-
est and policy inertia to reforms that are necessary to establish core insti-
tutional infrastructure. Further, opening the domestic sector to foreign 
fi nancial institutions often leads to capacity building and increases the 
pressure to strengthen supervisory and regulatory frameworks.
Smooth responses to fl uctuating capital fl ows not only require 
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accelerated institutional reforms in individual countries but also an 
upgraded regional fi nancial infrastructure. Although it is the domestic 
authorities and institutions that are ultimately responsible for a country’s 
fi nancial development and stability, regional cooperation over policy 
measures can play a supportive role during the liberalization process. For 
instance, technical assistance, human capital training programs, and the 
increased availability of fi nancial information can increase the ability of 
fi nancial systems to absorb fl uctuations in capital fl ows. Given that some 
countries in Asia are too small to have liquid domestic capital markets, 
the region could also proactively integrate the fi nancial markets in order 
to benefi t from economies of scale and liquidity agglomeration eff ects.
Furthermore, regional fi nancial cooperation eff orts such as the Chiang 
Mai Initiative, regional reserve pooling initiatives, and regional fi nancial 
surveillance help to build the resilience of the region to fi nancial shocks. 
Emergency crisis management procedures designed through an explicit 
regional institution will help slow the spread of any potential fi nancial 
contagion that might arise. Development of such ‘fi nancial circuit break-
ers’ can give policymakers the time to locate the specifi c cause of a given 
crisis and the opportunity to fi nd an appropriate resolution (Chow and 
Kriz, 2007).
Is it possible for a country whose fi nancial system is not yet well devel-
oped to reap the potential advantages of capital movements without the 
costs of crises? Closing the capital account, at one extreme, would mean 
foregoing the potential benefi ts that capital mobility could bring. At the 
other extreme, complete capital account convertibility inevitably results 
in instability. A way forward is for such a country to strike a middle 
ground, by imposing selective restrictions to alter the composition of 
capital infl ows. The capital controls (provided they can be eff ectively 
enforced) should be targeted at curbing excessive infl ows of short term 
loans that are prone to reversal. However, this may deter some investors 
from investing at all in the country, resulting in a reduction in the other 
more benefi cial forms of capital infl ows. As pointed out by Williamson 
(2005), this calls for a judicious balance between the volume and stability 
of capital fl ows.
NOTES
 1. Calvo et al. (1993) showed the dominant role for push factors, particularly the state 
of liquidity in the developed countries, as a driving force for capital fl ows to emerging 
markets.
 2. All balance of payment data described in this section are obtained from the Singapore 
Department of Statistics.
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 3. The huge direct investment outfl ow in 2001 is due to the two large foreign acquisi-
tions by the local telecommunications company Singtel and the Development Bank of 
Singapore (DBS).
 4. Trade credits, which are relatively stable despite their short tenor, form a separate com-
ponent in the other investment account.
 5. The trend break in the levels of M2 and the corresponding hikes in M2 growth rates at 
the end of 1998 are due to the incorporation of the Post Offi  ce Savings Bank (POSB) 
into the banking system when it was acquired by the DBS. From November 1998, 
POSB’s data has been incorporated in M1 and M2, and not as a non- bank fi nancial 
institution under M3.
 6. Obstfeld et al. (2004) provide a treatise on the open economy trilemma.
 7. With the onset of the Asian crisis, the Singapore dollar actually strengthened on a 
trade- weighted basis, despite having depreciated against the USD. This was due to a 
sharp depreciation of the regional currencies such as the Indonesian rupiah, Thai baht, 
and Malaysian ringgit.
 8. The MAS (2000) found that covered and uncovered interest parity tended to hold 
between Singapore and US one- and three- month inter- bank rates, respectively, in the 
1990s before the Asian crisis.
 9. We note that none of the restrictions had been imposed on the liability side of the bank 
balance sheet which means non- residents are free to build up Singapore dollar holdings 
by converting foreign currency into Singapore dollars and then place them with the 
domestic banking unit.
10. Since the end of 1997, the MAS has shifted its supervisory regime from a one- size- fi ts-
 all regulation to a risk- based approach.
11. The authors suggested a policy- driven paradigm for fi nancial liberalization in emerging 
open economies: management of the ‘fi nancial liberalization trilemma’ which states 
that the extent of any two of the following three components, namely domestic fi nancial 
development, exchange rate fl exibility and capital market openness, should determine 
the proper course of action for the third.
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